January 2026 - CHLA InfoSec Monthly Operations Report
Executive Summary
This report documents Information Security operations for January 2026 at Children’s Hospital Los Angeles (CHLA). The month was dominated by three major initiatives:
-
Internal Penetration Test (Mandiant) - Week-long assessment by Mandiant (Google Cloud Security) (January 19-23, 2026)
-
Dr. Shahab Linux Workstation Deployment - Production Linux workstation deployment with EAP-TLS authentication
-
CHLA Linux 802.1X Deployment Runbook - Comprehensive deployment documentation with attribute-driven CI/CD architecture
Month at a Glance
| Category | Activity | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
Security Assessment |
Internal Penetration Test (Mandiant) |
COMPLETE |
5-day engagement, findings pending |
Infrastructure |
Dr. Shahab Linux Workstation Deployment |
IN PROGRESS |
MAB onboarding complete, EAP-TLS migration pending |
Documentation |
CHLA Linux 802.1X Deployment Runbook |
IN PROGRESS |
3,681 lines, 54 attributes, Rev 3.0 |
Incident Response |
Dr. Pat Levitt Auth Failure |
ACTIVE |
Reported Jan 30, investigation ongoing |
Key Metrics
| Metric | Value | Context |
|---|---|---|
ISE Policy Objects Created |
18 |
Identity groups (2), dACLs (4), authz profiles (4), rules (8) |
Runbook Development |
3,681 lines |
Comprehensive deployment guide with 54 attributes |
Documentation Formats |
4 |
AsciiDoc source → HTML, PDF, DOCX, Markdown |
Infrastructure Attributes |
54 |
CI/CD-ready attribute-driven documentation |
|
Defender Status: chlxsbg workstation reported as NOT connected to Microsoft Defender for Endpoint as of Jan 30. Validation pending. |
1. Week 1: January 5-9 - Infrastructure Foundation
1.1. Monday, January 5
1.1.1. Linux Research Workstation ISE Design
|
Design Philosophy: MAB onboarding → Posture discovery → EAP-TLS migration → Full network access This staged approach allows initial connectivity while enforcing progressive security requirements. |
ISE Policy Architecture
Endpoint Identity Groups
| Group Name | Purpose | Parent |
|---|---|---|
Linux-Workstations |
Top-level Linux endpoint classification |
(root) |
Linux-Research-Workstations |
Research workstations (EAP-TLS capable) |
Linux-Workstations |
Linux-Research-Onboarding |
Initial MAB onboarding group |
Linux-Workstations |
|
Static Assignment Critical: ISE Profiling service will override group assignments unless Static Assignment checkbox is enabled during endpoint registration. |
Downloadable ACLs (dACLs)
|
Zero-Trust Design Principle: Each dACL implements least-privilege access:
|
Authorization Profiles
| Profile Name | VLAN | dACL | Reauth Timer |
|---|---|---|---|
Linux_Research_Onboard |
40 (CHLA-IoT) |
DACL_Research_Onboard |
28800s (8 hrs) |
Linux-Research-Posture-Pending |
40 |
Research-Linux-Posture-Discovery |
(session) |
Linux-Research-Full |
40 |
Research-Linux-Compliant |
(session) |
Linux-Research-Quarantine |
999 (Critical Auth Fallback) |
Research-Linux-Quarantine |
3600s (1 hr) |
|
VLAN 999 (Critical Auth Fallback) is a remediation-only network. Workstations in quarantine must resolve compliance issues before regaining research network access. |
1.2. Tuesday, January 6
1.2.1. Documentation Strategy Established
|
Decision: Adopt AsciiDoc as primary documentation format for all ISE deployment guides. Rationale:
|
Attribute-Driven Documentation Benefits
// Define infrastructure once
:ise-ppan-ip: 10.101.2.131
:nas-research: 10.134.144.109
// Reference everywhere
Log into ISE at {ise-ppan-ip}
Mount research NAS at {nas-research}
Result: Infrastructure changes require updating attribute definitions only, not hunting through 3,000+ lines of documentation.
1.3. Wednesday-Friday, January 7-9
1.3.1. Claroty XDome VNC Investigation
|
Security Concern: VNC traffic detected in OT segments without centralized inventory. Risk: Unauthorized remote access to medical imaging equipment, infusion pumps, and patient monitoring systems. |
|
Follow-Up Action: Schedule technical deep-dive with Mauricio to review XDome deployment architecture and integration with existing SIEM (Sentinel/QRadar). |
2. Week 2: January 12-16 - Pre-Pentest Preparation
2.1. Monday, January 12
2.1.1. GitOps Concerns Documentation
|
Topic: Securing git repositories containing infrastructure-as-code (IaC) and network automation scripts. Key Concerns:
|
Secrets Management Strategy
# dsec - Domain Secrets Manager
# Hierarchical secret storage with age encryption
dsource d001 dev/network # Development secrets
dsource d001 staging/network # Staging environment
dsource d001 prod/network # Production (restricted)
|
Production Secret Access: Production credentials (
|
2.2. Tuesday-Wednesday, January 13-14
2.2.1. Pen Testing Resources Research
Evil Twin Attack Scenarios
|
Wireless Security Concern: CHLA operates 2,000+ APs across 10 buildings. Rogue AP detection critical. Evil Twin Attack Vector:
|
Defensive Controls:
-
Cisco CMX (Connected Mobile Experiences) for rogue AP detection
-
Wireless IDS/IPS (Cisco CleanAir)
-
Certificate-based authentication (EAP-TLS (802.1X)) - immune to credential phishing
-
Client-side certificate pinning (future enhancement)
Termux Wireless Assessment Tools
|
Research Context: Android-based wireless security assessment using Termux terminal emulator. Tools Evaluated:
|
|
Use Case: Lightweight wireless assessment from mobile device during physical security walkthroughs. |
2.3. Thursday-Friday, January 15-16
2.3.1. LUKS Full Disk Encryption Research
LUKS Deployment Architecture
# Partition scheme for research workstation
/dev/nvme0n1p1 → /boot (unencrypted, 1GB)
/dev/nvme0n1p2 → LUKS container (remainder)
├── / (root filesystem, ext4)
├── /home (user data, ext4)
└── swap (encrypted swap)
|
Key Management Strategy:
Compliance: HIPAA Security Rule §164.312(a)(2)(iv) - Encryption and Decryption |
|
TPM Anti-Evil-Maid Protection: LUKS key sealed to PCR0-7 (firmware, bootloader, kernel measurements). If evil maid attack modifies boot chain, TPM refuses to unseal key → forces manual passphrase entry → alerts security team. |
3. Week 3: January 19-23 - Internal Penetration Test Week
3.1. Monday, January 19 - Pentest Day 1
3.1.1. Pre-Engagement Briefing
|
Rules of Engagement:
|
3.1.2. Network Access Provisioning
# Temporary VLAN for pentest team
VLAN 998 - Pentest-Isolated
- DHCP pool: 10.250.250.100-150
- No ACLs (full visibility to corporate network)
- Logged via NetFlow to QRadar
- Temporary ISE authz profile: "Pentest-Unrestricted"
|
Post-Engagement Cleanup:
|
3.2. Tuesday, January 20 - Pentest Day 2
3.2.1. Wireless Assessment Observations
|
Finding (Preliminary): Sarah identified 3 corporate SSIDs with different security postures:
Concern: MSCHAPv2 vulnerable to offline dictionary attacks if RADIUS traffic captured. Remediation: Migrate all corporate users to EAP-TLS (certificate-based authentication). |
|
Quick Win: Deploy EAP-TLS configuration profile via Intune/JAMF. Users receive client certificate automatically without manual configuration. |
3.3. Wednesday, January 21 - Pentest Day 3
3.3.1. AD Credential Harvesting Attempt
|
Test Scenario: Sarah deployed rogue LDAP responder to capture AD authentication attempts. Result: BLOCKED Defensive Control: ISE dACL on onboarding profile restricts LDAP traffic to authorized AD DCs only:
Lesson Learned: Zero-trust dACLs prevent lateral movement even with network access. |
3.3.2. Linux Workstation Deployment Acceleration
Deployment Timeline (Accelerated)
| Phase | Activity | Owner | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
Phase 1 |
ISE policy objects creation |
Evan Rosado |
DONE |
Phase 2 |
Workstation prep (chlxsbg) |
Ben (Desktop Support) |
DONE |
Phase 3 |
Certificate enrollment (ADCS) |
Evan Rosado |
IN PROGRESS |
Phase 4 |
NetworkManager EAP-TLS config |
Ben + Evan Rosado |
PENDING |
Phase 5 |
Posture client installation |
Evan Rosado |
PENDING |
Phase 6 |
Validation & handoff |
Evan Rosado |
PENDING |
|
Blocker Identified (Jan 23): Microsoft Defender for Endpoint not connected on chlxsbg. Impact: Posture policy will fail compliance check. Action Required: Troubleshoot Defender connectivity before EAP-TLS migration. |
3.4. Thursday, January 22 - Pentest Day 4
3.4.1. Runbook Development Sprint
|
Objective: Document Dr. Shahab Linux Workstation Deployment deployment process for knowledge transfer. Deliverable: CHLA Linux 802.1X Deployment Runbook Scope: Complete deployment guide from ISE policy creation through post-deployment validation. |
Runbook Structure
= Dr. Shahab Linux Workstation Deployment - CHLA
:description: CHLA InfoSec monthly operations summary - January 2026
== Phase 0: Prerequisites & Validation
- ISE resource verification
- Certificate authority health check
- AD group membership validation
== Phase 1: ISE Pre-Configuration
1.5 Cisco Secure Posture Client validation
1.6 Cisco Secure Umbrella Client validation
== Phase 2: Workstation Configuration
- OS installation & hardening
- Domain join procedures
- Certificate enrollment
== Phase 3: 802.1X Configuration
- NetworkManager EAP-TLS setup
- Switch port configuration
- Initial authentication test
== Phase 4: Post-Deployment Validation
- ISE Live Logs verification
- Network connectivity testing
- Compliance monitoring
== Appendix A: Troubleshooting
== Appendix B: Switch Configuration
== Appendix C: Certificate Management
== Appendix D: ISE Configuration Guide (GUI-based)
|
Documentation as Code: Runbook uses 54 attributes for infrastructure references. Changes to IP addresses, hostnames, or policy names require updating attribute definitions only. |
3.5. Friday, January 23 - Pentest Day 5 (FINAL)
3.5.2. Azure DevOps LFS Issue
|
Git LFS Endpoint Misconfiguration: Repository push failing with:
Root Cause: Fix Required:
|
4. Week 4: January 26-30 - Runbook Refinement & Incident Response
4.1. Monday, January 26
4.1.1. Azure Legacy Infrastructure Kick-Off
|
Security Requirements:
|
4.2. Tuesday-Thursday, January 27-29
4.2.1. Runbook Attribute Maximization
|
Refactoring Initiative: Convert all hardcoded values in CHLA Linux 802.1X Deployment Runbook to AsciiDoc attributes. Before:
After:
Result: 54 total attributes covering infrastructure, users, ISE policies, VLANs, and file paths. |
Attribute Categories
| Category | Count | Examples |
|---|---|---|
Infrastructure |
18 |
DNS servers, AD DCs, ISE cluster, NAS |
Device-Specific |
10 |
Hostname, MAC, IP, switch port, certificates |
ISE Policy |
18 |
Policy sets, authz profiles, dACLs, endpoint groups, VLANs |
Users |
4 |
Dr. Shahab, Xiangming Ding (email, short names) |
Filesystem |
4 |
Certificate directories, SSSD config, crypttab |
4.2.2. Netapi Reference Removal
|
Compliance Issue: CHLA Linux 802.1X Deployment Runbook contained 70 references to Problem: Runbook intended for sharing with CHLA InfoSec team. Netapi is personal tooling, not approved for enterprise use. Solution: Replace all netapi commands with ISE GUI navigation instructions. |
Before/After Examples
| Before (Netapi) | After (ISE GUI) |
|---|---|
|
Navigate to: Operations → RADIUS → Live Sessions
|
|
Navigate to: Context Visibility → Endpoints View all registered endpoints and their assigned identity groups. |
|
Personal Tooling Strategy:
Separation ensures work documentation is portable while retaining automation capabilities for personal use. |
4.3. Friday, January 30
4.3.1. Incident Response: Dr. Pat Levitt Authentication Failure
Initial Response Plan
| Phase | Actions |
|---|---|
1. Information Gathering |
|
2. ISE Diagnostics |
Load credentials: |
3. Common Failure Checks |
|
4. Resolution |
TBD based on findings |
|
Investigation Log: Will be updated as findings are discovered… |
4.3.2. Daily Capture System Implementation
|
New Workflow: AsciiDoc-based daily captures with multi-format output. Created:
Benefits:
|
Build Script Usage
# Build all formats
./build.sh 2026/01/WRKX-2026-01-30-chla-infosec-ops.adoc
# Build specific format
./build.sh 2026/01/WRKX-2026-01-30-chla-infosec-ops.adoc pdf
# Output location
2026/01/output/
├── WRKX-2026-01-30-chla-infosec-ops.html (48K)
├── WRKX-2026-01-30-chla-infosec-ops.pdf (148K)
└── WRKX-2026-01-30-chla-infosec-ops.docx (16K)
|
|
6. Deliverables & Documentation
6.1. Completed Deliverables
| Deliverable | Format | Lines/Pages | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
CHLA Linux 802.1X Deployment Runbook |
AsciiDoc |
3,681 lines |
Rev 3.0 |
ISE Policy Objects (Linux Research) |
ISE Configuration |
18 objects |
DEPLOYED |
dACL Design Documentation |
AsciiDoc |
450 lines |
DONE |
Daily Capture System |
Shell script + templates |
150 lines |
OPERATIONAL |
Attribute-Driven Runbook |
AsciiDoc attributes |
54 attributes |
IMPLEMENTED |
6.2. In-Progress Documentation
| Document | Owner | Target Date |
|---|---|---|
ISE Integration Architecture Diagrams |
Evan Rosado |
Feb 15, 2026 |
Posture Policy Implementation Guide |
Evan Rosado |
Feb 28, 2026 |
EAP-TLS Migration Playbook |
Evan Rosado + Wireless Team |
Mar 15, 2026 |
Azure Government Cloud Architecture |
Infrastructure + Evan Rosado |
Apr 1, 2026 |
7. Lessons Learned
7.1. Technical Insights
|
Attribute-Driven Documentation is Critical for CI/CD Centralizing configuration values as attributes enables:
Example: Changing ISE PAN IP address requires updating 1 attribute definition instead of hunting through 3,681 lines. |
|
Separate Work vs. Personal Tools netapi (proprietary automation CLI) is powerful for automation but proprietary. Work documentation must use standard, shareable methods (ISE GUI) to enable knowledge transfer. Strategy:
|
|
Operational Incidents Always Take Priority Dr. Shahab Linux Workstation Deployment deployment was paused immediately when Dr. Pat Levitt authentication issue reported. Rule: Production user impact > project work > documentation > research |
7.2. Process Improvements
|
Build Scripts for Professional Reports
Impact: Monthly operations reports can be generated in seconds, not hours of manual formatting. |
|
Static Assignment Checkbox is Non-Negotiable ISE Profiling service will override endpoint group assignments unless Static Assignment is explicitly enabled. Failure Mode: Manually assign endpoint to group → Profiler moves it back to "Unknown" → Authorization fails → User loses network access Solution: Document checkbox requirement prominently in all deployment procedures. |
8. Security Posture Assessment
8.1. Strengths
| Control | Evidence |
|---|---|
Zero-Trust Network Access |
dACLs restrict traffic to authorized services only. Lateral movement blocked even with network access. |
Certificate-Based Authentication |
EAP-TLS immune to credential phishing, offline dictionary attacks, and evil twin attacks. |
Posture Assessment Integration |
Continuous compliance monitoring (firewall, antivirus, Defender, Umbrella). |
Segmented Research Network |
VLAN 40 isolated from clinical systems. Quarantine VLAN 999 for non-compliant devices. |
Comprehensive Logging |
ISE Live Logs, NetFlow to QRadar, dACL deny rules logged for forensics. |
8.2. Weaknesses & Remediation
| Weakness | Risk | Remediation | Priority |
|---|---|---|---|
MSCHAPv2 (CHLA-Corporate SSID) |
Credential harvesting via RADIUS capture |
Migrate to EAP-TLS |
CRITICAL |
Defender Coverage Gaps |
Unmonitored endpoints (Linux workstations) |
Validate Defender agent deployment |
HIGH |
VNC in OT Networks |
Unauthorized remote access to medical devices |
Deploy Claroty XDome monitoring |
HIGH |
GetWell YouTube Access |
Unrestricted internet from clinical VLAN |
Implement DNS filtering (Umbrella) |
MEDIUM |
9. Recommendations
9.1. Immediate Actions (Next 30 Days)
-
Complete Dr. Pat Levitt Investigation
-
Root cause analysis
-
Preventive controls if systemic issue
-
-
Resolve Microsoft Defender for Endpoint Connectivity
-
Validate agent installation on chlxsbg
-
Test posture policy enforcement
-
Document troubleshooting procedures
-
-
Review Pentest Findings
-
Formal report expected Feb 7
-
Prioritize remediation roadmap
-
Allocate resources for fixes
-
-
Finalize Dr. Shahab Linux Workstation Deployment Deployment
-
MAB → EAP-TLS migration
-
User acceptance testing
-
Knowledge transfer to Desktop Support
-
9.2. Strategic Initiatives (Next 90 Days)
-
EAP-TLS Migration Planning
-
Pilot group selection (100 users)
-
Intune MDM enrollment verification
-
Certificate auto-enrollment testing
-
Rollback procedures
-
-
Linux Posture Policy Deployment
-
Define compliance requirements
-
ISE posture agent deployment
-
Remediation workflows
-
User communication
-
-
Claroty XDome Integration
-
Technical architecture review
-
SIEM integration (Sentinel/QRadar)
-
Alert tuning
-
Runbook development
-
-
Azure Government Cloud Migration
-
Zero-trust network architecture
-
Private endpoint design
-
NSG rule standardization
-
Compliance validation (HIPAA, HITRUST)
-
10. Security Tools & Platforms - Learning Roadmap
10.1. Overview
This section tracks security tools and platforms that require hands-on learning, implementation, or deeper integration into CHLA InfoSec operations. All items are marked as NOT STARTED - these represent skill development and platform maturation goals for upcoming quarters.
10.2. Threat Intelligence & Analysis Platforms
| Tool/Platform | Learning Objectives | Business Value | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
Cisco Talos Intelligence |
|
Real-time threat intelligence for network access control, IoT device profiling, DNS filtering |
NOT STARTED |
VirusTotal |
|
Incident response acceleration, malware triage, hash reputation checks |
NOT STARTED |
URLScan.io |
|
Phishing response, suspicious link analysis, user-reported URL validation |
NOT STARTED |
AbuseIPDB |
|
Network traffic analysis, firewall rule optimization, incident attribution |
NOT STARTED |
10.3. Extended Detection & Response (XDR)
| Platform | Learning Objectives | Business Value | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
XDR Platform (Microsoft Defender XDR / Palo Alto Cortex) |
|
Reduced mean time to detect (MTTD), automated incident response, unified security operations |
NOT STARTED |
|
Platform Selection Pending: CHLA currently uses Microsoft Defender for Endpoint. Evaluate if expanding to full Microsoft Defender XDR (includes Office 365, Identity, Cloud Apps) meets requirements before considering third-party XDR platforms. |
10.4. Security Information & Event Management (SIEM)
| Platform | Learning Objectives | Business Value | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
IBM QRadar SIEM |
|
Centralized security monitoring, compliance reporting (HIPAA, HITRUST), threat detection across hybrid infrastructure |
NOT STARTED |
10.5. Learning & Implementation Priorities
10.5.1. Phase 1: Immediate (Next 30 Days)
| Tool | Focus Area | Priority |
|---|---|---|
AbuseIPDB |
IP reputation checks during incident response |
HIGH |
VirusTotal |
Hash/URL lookups for malware triage |
HIGH |
Cisco Talos |
Threat feed integration research |
MEDIUM |
10.5.2. Phase 2: Short-Term (Next 90 Days)
| Platform | Focus Area | Priority |
|---|---|---|
IBM QRadar SIEM |
|
CRITICAL |
URLScan.io |
Phishing investigation workflows |
MEDIUM |
10.5.3. Phase 3: Long-Term (Next 180 Days)
| Platform | Focus Area | Priority |
|---|---|---|
XDR Platform |
|
MEDIUM |
VirusTotal Enterprise |
Private scanning evaluation for sensitive files |
LOW |
10.6. Success Metrics
| Metric | Target |
|---|---|
Threat Intelligence Lookups/Week |
>50 (AbuseIPDB + VirusTotal + Talos) |
QRadar Proficiency |
Ability to investigate incidents independently without vendor support |
SIEM Custom Rules Created |
≥5 rules for CHLA-specific use cases (Linux 802.1X, posture failures, dACL violations) |
Incident Response Time Reduction |
30% faster triage with integrated threat intelligence |
10.7. Training Resources
| Platform | Resources |
|---|---|
Cisco Talos |
|
QRadar |
|
XDR |
|
Threat Intelligence |
|
11. Appendix A: Infrastructure Reference
11.1. ISE Cluster Configuration
| Node | Hostname | IP Address | Role |
|---|---|---|---|
PAN (Primary) |
ppan.ise.chla.org |
10.101.2.121 |
Policy administration |
PAN (Secondary) |
span.ise.chla.org |
10.101.2.122 |
Policy administration (HA) |
PSN-1 |
ise-psn-01.chla.org |
10.101.2.131 |
Policy enforcement |
PSN-2 |
ise-psn-02.chla.org |
10.101.2.132 |
Policy enforcement |
PSN-3 |
ise-psn-03.chla.org |
10.248.11.134 |
Policy enforcement |
PSN-4 |
ise-psn-04.chla.org |
10.248.11.135 |
Policy enforcement |
|
High Availability:
|
11.2. Active Directory Infrastructure
| Domain Controller | IP Address | Role |
|---|---|---|
chla-dc-01.la.ad.chla.org |
10.112.118.141 |
Primary DC |
chla-dc-02.la.ad.chla.org |
10.112.118.143 |
Secondary DC |
chla-pdc.la.ad.chla.org |
10.100.11.28 |
PDC Emulator |
chla-dc-03.la.ad.chla.org |
10.100.11.27 |
Read-Only DC |
11.3. Network Segmentation
| VLAN | Name | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
40 |
CHLA-IoT |
Research workstations and NAS |
999 |
Critical Auth Fallback |
Non-compliant device quarantine |
12. Appendix B: Glossary
- ADCS
-
Active Directory Certificate Services - Microsoft PKI infrastructure
- dACL
-
Downloadable Access Control List - Dynamic firewall rules pushed from ISE to network switches
- EAP-TLS
-
Extensible Authentication Protocol - Transport Layer Security - Certificate-based 802.1X authentication
- ISE
-
Cisco Identity Services Engine - Network access control platform
- LUKS
-
Linux Unified Key Setup - Full disk encryption for Linux
- MAB
-
MAC Authentication Bypass - Network access based on MAC address (pre-certificate enrollment)
- MSCHAPv2
-
Microsoft Challenge-Handshake Authentication Protocol version 2 - Password-based authentication (DEPRECATED)
- PSN
-
Policy Service Node - ISE component that enforces network access policies
- Zero-Trust
-
Security model requiring strict identity verification for every user/device regardless of network location
13. Appendix C: Contact Information
| Name | Role | Contact |
|---|---|---|
Evan Rosado |
Senior Network Security Engineer |
|
Dr. Shahab Asgharzadeh |
Research Scientist - Spatial Biology and Genomics Core |
|
Xiangming Ding |
Senior Bioinformatics Scientist |
|
Dr. Pat Levitt |
USC Faculty/Non Physician CWR Neurology CWR |
|
Sarah |
Penetration Tester - Mandiant (Google Cloud Security) |
(via engagement portal) |
14. Document Revision History
| Version | Date | Changes |
|---|---|---|
1.0 |
2026-01-31 |
Initial monthly operations report for January 2026 |
Document Information
Document ID: MONTHLY-2026-01
Classification: INTERNAL USE ONLY
Distribution: CHLA InfoSec Leadership
Reporting Period: January 2026
Generated: 2026-01-31
Author: Evan Rosado (Senior Network Security Engineer)
Department: Information Security
Organization: Children’s Hospital Los Angeles
This document contains confidential information. Unauthorized distribution prohibited.